Hadith 39: “Allah Has Pardoned …”

  1. “Allah has pardoned”
    1.1 What Exactly Has Been Pardoned?
    1.2 Different Types of Rights
    1.3 General Introduction to the Concept of Legal Capacity
  2. “for my Nation”
  3. “[what is done] mistakenly”
    3.1 Does the Pardoning of Mistakes Include Mistakes Concerning Matters that are Considered Definitive?
  4. “[what is done] out of forgetfulness”
    4.1 More Details About Mistakes and Forgetfulness
    4.2 Two Approaches to Forgetfulness
    4.3 When is Forgetfulness Not an Excuse?
  5. “[what is done] under duress”
    5.1 The Act One is Being Coerced to Perform
    5.2 Accountability for the Coerced Act
  6. Related Fiqh Issues
    6.1 Missing a Prayer Due to Forgetfulness or Mistake
    6.2 Mistakenly Killing Another Muslim
    6.3 Forgetting to Mention Allah’s Name Upon Slaughtering an Animal
    6.4 Speaking During the Prayer Out of Forgetfulness
    6.5 Eating, Drinking or Sexual Intercourse Out of Forgetfulness While Fasting Ramadhaan
    6.6 Making Acts or Stating Words of Unbelief While Under Duress
    6.7 Being Coerced to Kill Another Muslim
    6.8 Being Coerced to Break One’s Fast While Traveling
    6.9 Some Conclusions

On the authority of ibn Abbaas (may Allah be pleased with both of them): The Messenger of Allah (may Allah’s blessing and peace be upon him) said, “On my behalf, Allah has pardoned for my Nation [what is done] mistakenly, out of forgetfulness or under duress.” A hasan hadith recorded by ibn Maajah, al-Baihaqi and others.

General Comments About the Hadith:
This hadith is extremely important to the topic of personal responsibility. In the way that it is understood by some, it has ramifications for virtually every area of fiqh. It demonstrates that Allah does not consider people sinful when their actions are not representative of their intentions. In general, a sin is something done against the shareeah, knowingly and willingly. Al-Haitami argued that this hadith spans the entire gamut of human action. By its stated meaning, it shows that man is not responsible for what he does out of forgetfulness, mistake or coercion. By implication, then, it means that man is responsible for everything else that he does. Hence, it covers all of the acts of the shareeah.

This hadith is also one of the manifestations of the shareeah’ s removal of hardship from the people. Allah states in the Quran, “He has not placed upon you in the religion any hardship” (al-Hajj 78). To hold a person sinful and completely responsible for acts that he did by mistake, out of forgetfulness or while being coerced would entail a great deal of hardship and difficulty. Ibn Humaid points out that such could reach the level of burdening a person beyond what he can bear which is categorically denied of the shareeah. Therefore, the shareeah has lessened the burden and held humans free of sin in those cases.

1. “Allah has pardoned

This hadith demonstrates the great mercy and compassion that Allah has for the followers of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). No one can force Allah to judge in a particular fashion or decree a particular matter. But this hadith points to Allah’s wisdom, justice and mercy. Al-Haitami stated, Pardoning those aspects [that is, the sin of unintentional acts, acts done out of forgetfulness or coercion] is the requirement of wisdom, even though if Allah were to hold one to account for those acts He would be just [since they are the person’s acts]. However, the benefit of responsibility and its goal is to distinguish between the obedient one and the sinner, and to destroy the one who is to be destroyed after he received clear guidance and to give real life to the alive on the basis of clear guidance. Any act of obedience or disobedience needs an intention for it to be tied to reward or punishment. The three cases [described in this hadith] are devoid of such intention. The first two cases are clear in and of themselves. As for the third case, the intention is from the one doing the coercing and not the coerced himself, he is simply like a tool.

1.1 What Exactly Has Been Pardoned?

It is obvious that mistakes, forgetfulness and coercion occur among the Muslim nation. This hadith does not imply that such would not occur among this nation, although some of the narrations of the hadith could give that impression. Important questions that arise are: What exactly has been pardoned? Has the entire act been pardoned including both the sinful nature of the act as well as its legal ruling in this world? Or has just the possible sinful nature been pardoned while the worldly ruling and consequences must still be tended to by the individual involved? If the act performed was a permissible, non-sinful act, is the worldly ruling then considered void or is it enforceable?

In some cases, there are explicit texts from the Quran and sunnah stating what should be done in the case of mistake, forgetfulness or coercion. For example, in the case of mistakenly killing another believer, the Quran has laid down the expiation for that act. Those cases that have been explicitly addressed in other texts are not problematic. One simply follows the specific text related to that case.

The problem arises when no other relevant text exists. In those cases, there is a difference of opinion among the different schools of fiqh as to the understanding and application of this particular hadith. The hadith itself is open to being interpreted as the sinful nature of the act is overlooked and pardoned. It is also open to mean that all of the rulings associated with that act are to be pardoned, as if the act itself never occurred. All scholars seem to agree that the sinful nature of the act has definitely been removed. They differ only with respect to the worldly legal ramifications.

1.2 Different Types of Rights

Perhaps the answer to the above question, “Given no other evidence, does this hadith imply that both the sin and worldly ruling of an are overlooked or just the sin?” may be answered by viewing the question from a different angle. In this approach, one emphasizes the type of right involved. Based on the type of right, one may say that just the sin or both the sin and worldly ruling are overlooked. In Islamic law, there are different types of rights. There are the rights of Allah upon His servants, such as prayers, fasting and so forth. With respect to the deeds that violate those rights, a general principle is that if the person has faith, any act he performs without complete intention or which he cannot perform due to incapability are forgiven and pardoned by Allah. This is, of course, related to Allah’s encompassing and great mercy and forgiveness.

There are other rights that are termed, “the rights of Allah,” but in reality they are referring to the rights of the community as a whole as opposed to the rights of the individual. The general principle is that these rights are not to be violated. However, if they are violated by mistake or something similar to that, they may be overlooked to some extent depending on the exact situation. Examples of these types of rights are the prescribed punishments, such as the punishment for adultery and theft. These are the “rights of Allah” and no one has the right to lessen those punishments once the conditions for their enactment have been fulfilled.

The last types of rights are the rights of the individuals themselves. Under no circumstances is it allowed for one person to violate the rights of another person. If one person does so, even if Allah does not hold him sinful for his act, he still must undo the wrong that he has done to the other person. When looked at in this way, there seems to be general agreement among the scholars that the rights of humans cannot be violated even in the case of mistake, forgetfulness or coercion. In other words, if such rights are violated, the worldly ruling is not “overlooked” and there must be some form of compensation done for the personal right that was violated. However, this agreement among the scholars may be based on other evidences, such as the numerous hadith stressing the inviolability of people’s lives, wealth and honor. It may also be based on general principles of public welfare which would be at risk if people were not held responsible for the acts they committed due to mistakes or out of forgetfulness.

Also when it comes to the rights of the community, the second category of the “rights of Allah” discussed abo.ve, such rights are not completely overlooked when acts are done by mistake, out of forgetfulness or due to coercion. It is true that the legal punishments are not meted out. But that is due to other evidences that demonstrate that in the case of doubt or a questionable aspect, one does not apply the full legal punishments; and mistakes, forgetfulness and coercion are considered doubtful or questionable. Furthermore, since the sin has been removed from the act, there is actually no room to punish the person. The punishment is meant to be for the sin that the person committed.

That leaves only two areas left open for this hadith to have any worldly effect. The first area is the “rights of Allah”, such as prayer, fasting and so forth. If a person does an act that would normally invalidate one of these acts of worship but he does it by mistake, out of forgetfulness or due to coercion, does that mean that the act is still considered valid? It seems that those who argue that this hadith also covers the worldly rulings must answer positively, that the act is still valid. The others, the Hanafis and those who accept their interpretation of this hadith, would answer in the negative and say that those acts are invalidated.

But even with respect to the “rights of Allah”, the Shafi’ees, such as alHisni, do not liberally apply the principle that they derive from this hadith. Note the following conclusions from al-Hisni’s work based on the Shafi ‘ee school:
(i) If a person becomes certain that he performed the prayer in the wrong direction by mistake, there is no sin upon him (based on this hadith) but his prayer is not valid. He must repeat his prayer.
(ii) If a person forgets to make ablution, his prayer is not valid.
(iii) If a person speaks a lot during the prayer out of forgetfulness, his prayer becomes void.
(iv) If a person forgets and performs the act of ablution in the wrong order, then his ablution is not valid and he must repeat his ablution and any
prayers he performed based on that ablution.
(v) If someone forgets that he has some impurity on his clothing, then his prayer performed with such impurity on his clothing is not valid.
(vi) If someone has two bowls of water and he believes that one of them has pure water and he makes ablution from it and then later he determines that it was impure, he must repeat his ablution and any prayers he said afterwards.
(vii) If a person gives zakat to another person thinking him to be poor but it turns out that he is rich, he has not fulfilled his obligation of zakat and he must still pay the zakat to the poor.

Al-Hisni tries to argue that the proof that one must make up what one has missed by mistake or forgetfulness is based on the hadith, “Whoever forgets a prayer must pray it when he remembers it. And there is no expiation for it except that.” (Recorded by al-Bukhari and Muslim.) In other words, what he is saying is that this hadith establishes a principle that restricts the application of the hadith, “Allah has pardoned … ” And all those cases mentioned above, therefore, are simply analogous cases to the case of the person who has forgotten a prayer.

However, that argument is not acceptable. It is not acceptable because umoom al-muqtadhaa is considered a textual argument- that is, as if the words were explicitly stated in the hadith 2- and a textual argument cannot be overruled by an analogy based on another textual argument. In other words, if the concept of umoom al-muqtadhaa is accepted for this hadith, “Allah has pardoned … “, then the hadith quoted above, “Whoever forgets a prayer must pray it. ..,” provides an exception to the general ruling for the prayer only. But no further analogy may be made on the basis of that particular ruling.

To make this point clearer, here is how it would apply in case (vii) mentioned above: If a person gives his zakat to an undeserving recipient by mistake, on the basis of umoom al-muqtadhaa and this hadith, “Allah has pardoned … “, one would have to say that he has fulfilled his obligation of zakat and need not repay it to a deserving person. The “worldly ruling” of his mistake is to be overlooked. One cannot argue on the basis of analogy with one who has forgotten his prayer because analogy cannot overrule what is understood to be actually stated in this hadith.

Ironically, all of those Shafi’ee opinions stated above could be considered correct if one argues that there is no umoom al-muqtadhaa and that this hadith, “Allah has pardoned … ,” does not apply to any worldly rulings at all. In this case, one can then argue in all of those issues on the basis of analogy with the hadith, “Whoever forgets a prayer must pray it. ..” The second area is the permissible acts that one performs by mistake, out of forgetfulness or due to coercion. Are such acts valid and enforceable or are they considered null and void due to the understanding that this hadith, “Allah has pardoned … ” also covers worldly rulings? The Hanafi response to this question is that such are not overlooked as this hadith is irrelevant to them. Those who understand this hadith in its broadest sense would have to argue that such acts are indeed overlooked and considered null and void.

There is another important aspect that needs to be noted here. If it is concluded that this hadith is only in reference to the sinful nature of acts done by mistake, forgetfulness or under duress, then these permissible acts are not related to this hadith. These permissible acts have no sinful nature to them whatsoever. Hence, this hadith has no bearing on them at all. Once again, even if the concept of umoom al-muqtadhaa is rejected, there is ample evidence to demonstrate that statements made out of coercion are not legally binding on the person.

From coercion, one can use analogy to apply the same principle to acts done by mistake or out of forgetfulness. For example, Allah says, “Whoever disbelieves in Allah after his belief [shall earn the wrath of Allah] except for one who is forced [to renounce his religion] while his heart is secure in faith. But those who [willingly] open their breasts to disbelief, upon them is wrath from Allah, and for them is a great punishment” (al-Nahl 106). If statements of unbelief are to be overlooked due to coercion, obviously, statements concerning lesser matters must also be overlooked. lbn Humaid argues that such a conclusion is most consistent with the general shareeah principles of removing hardship and facilitating matters for all.

The above points demonstrate that even those who claim that this hadith applies to both the sin and the ruling of a deed adhere to the following:
(a) The worldly ruling is not pardoned when individual rights are violated.
(b) The worldly ruling is not completely pardoned or overlooked when community rights are violated.
(c) The worldly ruling is not even completely pardoned when the specific rights of Allah (acts of worship) are violated.

Where does that leave this hadith? If one claims that both the sin and the worldly ruling are to be overlooked and pardon, one must then put that into effect with respect to the relevant cases. However, by agreement of the scholars, that does not seem to be done. The only conclusion that one is forced to reach is that the meaning of this hadith is that the sin of such acts is overlooked and pardoned. It does not mean that the worldly ruling of such acts are overlooked or pardoned. When the worldly ruling of such acts are indeed overlooked, it is not due to the understanding of this hadith but it is due to other evidence.

1.3 General Introduction to the Concept of Legal Capacity

Before continuing with the commentary to this hadith, some general points about legal capacity need to be stated. A person is considered fully legally capable if there are no impediments to his acting in a correct matter. First and foremost, the person must be living, adult/mature, intelligent and sane. As long as a person is sane and mature, he is considered a responsible agent. However, even when a person is adult and sane, there may be other circumstances that affect his actions. Although he remains a responsible agent and must continue to fulfill his obligations, these other circumstances may make him act in a way that he did not complete intend.

The aspects mentioned by the Prophet (peace be upon him) in this hadith are called, by the legal theorists, “circumstances affecting legal capacity”. These are defined in the following manner, The circumstances affecting the legal capacity are those matters which are not essential to it. They are initially accidental; that is, they are qualities or circumstances which change the commands, such as journey, or destroy the capacity [to fulfill a command], for it prevents the capacity of obligation or capacity of execution from establishment, such as death, sleep, and a fainting fit. In short, awarid are those circumstances which are incompatible with legal capacity of man in general, and which are not necessary for him.

As just alluded to, under certain circumstances, a person cannot be held completely liable for his actions although he is living, sane and mature. This is because his actions have occurred without his complete intention and desire or his ability to perform actions has been curtailed due to some circumstances beyond his control. This does not mean that he is free of any responsibility. In many cases, he is still responsible and has to fulfill or make up for those obligations upon him. However, to lessen the burden under such circumstances, the shareeah has taken into consideration their situation and, depending on the situation, has laid down laws easing the burden of those who are faced with such constraints.

Such circumstances can be divided into two broad categories. The first category is actions that are not the result of the person’s own doing. They are termed, “acts of providence”. This category includes “lunacy, infancy, idiocy, forgetfulness, sleep, fainting fit, slavery, illness, menstruation,” post-partum hemorrhaging and death.

The second category of acts are those that are brought about, in one way or another, by the man’s own actions. Man brings about such a situation and man can remove such a situation, by the will and permission of Allah. This can be further subdivided into two categories. The first subcategory is the result of actions by the person himself. This category includes, “ignorance, drunkenness, jest, folly and mistake.”1 The second subcategory is the result of other’s actions upon the person. This is the case of coercion or duress.

The shareeah makes special allowances for cases wherein a person’s complete will or pleasure with the act that he is performing is absent. For example, a person may perform an act because he has few other options albeit he is not pleased with the act that he is performing. This person’s acts, as is demonstrated by the hadith under discussion here, will be looked at in a way different from that of a person who performs an act with its complete intention and while being pleased with the act that he is performing. Since this hadith only mentions the three aspects of forgetfulness, unintentional acts and duress, only those three aspects will be discussed in detail.

2. “for my Nation”

The narration below from Sahih Muslim gives the impression that this grace from Allah is a special bounty for the Nation of Muhammad (peace be upon him}- that is, those people who responded to the call of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). This is in response to their willingness to submit to Allah even in the most difficult of matters. Imam Muslim recorded in his Sahih:

Abu Huraira said: When [the following words of the Quran] were revealed, “To Allah belongs whatever is in the heavens and whatever is in the Earth and whether you disclose that which is in your mind or conceal it, Allah will call you to account for it. Then He forgives whom He pleases and punishes whom He pleases. And Allah has power over everything” [al-Baqara 284), the Companions of the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) felt it to be very hard and severe. So they came to the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) and sat down on their knees. They said, “O Messenger of Allah, we have been obligated some duties that were within our power to perform, such as prayer, fasting, jihaad and charity. Then this verse was revealed to you and it is beyond our power to live up to it.”

The Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) said, “Do you intend to say what the people of the two books [Jews and Christians] said before you, ‘We hear and disobey’? Instead, you should say, ‘We hear and we obey, [and we seek] Your forgiveness, our Lord, and unto you is the return.”‘ The people immediately said that and it flowed from their tongues. Then Allah immediately revealed, “The Messenger believes in that which is sent down unto him from his Lord and so do the believers. Each one believes in Allah and His angels and His books and His messengers. They say, ‘We differentiate not between any of His messengers’ and they say, ‘We hear and we obey. [We seek] your forgiveness, our Lord, and unto You is the return‘” [al-Baqara 285). When they did that, Allah particularized the [above verse] and the Great, Majestic Allah then revealed, “Allah burdens not any soul beyond what it can bear. For it [is every good] it earns and against it [is every evil] it earns. Our Lord! Punish us not if we forget or make a mistake.” [The Prophet (peace be upon him) then said,] “Yes, [it is so].” “Our Lord! Do not lay on us a burden as You did upon those before us.” [The Prophet (peace be upon him) again] said, “Yes [it is so].” “Our Lord! Impose not upon us [burdens] which we have not the strength to bear.” [The Prophet (peace be upon him) again said,] “Yes [it is so].” “Pardon us and grant us protection and have mercy on us. You are our protector, so grant us victory over the disbelieving people” [al-Baqara 286). He again said, “Yes.” (Recorded by Muslim.)

According to al-Bugha and Mistu, among the Tribes of Israel, if they did something wrong out of forgetfulness or if they did something mistakenly, Allah would still hold them to account and punish them for that such an act. Ibn Katheer mentions this hadith, “Allah has pardoned … ” in his discussion of the verse, “He [the Prophet (peace be upon him)] releases them [the people of the Book who embrace Islam] from their heavy burdens and the yokes that were upon them” (al-Araaf 157). That is to say, it was part of the Prophet’s mission to remove those hardships and difficulties that were placed upon the earlier peoples. Part of those hardships, as ibn Katheer understood, was being held completely responsible for what they did out of, for example, forgetfulness and mistake.

Allah knows best, most likely those more stringent and difficult regulations for the previous peoples were due to their own intransigence and refusal to submit willingly to Allah’s commands. This is implied in the above hadith where the Prophet (peace be upon him) has warned the Muslims not to be like the earlier peoples who said, “We hear and disobey.” According to al-Sharnoobi, being pardoned for the acts done by mistake or out of forgetfulness is something special for this Nation. That is why Muslims have been taught the above supplication, “Our Lord, punish us not if we forget or make a mistake.” This supplication is made as way of seeking the continuance of that great blessing upon this Nation.

3. “[what is done] mistakenly”

Hasan has given the following definitions for khata (mistake) as found in some of the standard references on Islamic legal theory: Mistake (khata’) is a deed or word which springs forth from a man without his intention as the result of carelessness by his directly pursuing a matter which is other than the one intended by him … Mistake (khata’) is a deed performed by a man without intending it perfectly… Mistake (khata’) means that a man aims by his action at an object other than that at which he aims by his negligent conduct.

Hence, in essence, a person performs a deed which he believes is good and proper but it turns out that it is not proper and is not the correct act or not performed in the correct manner In Allah’s sight, under such circumstances, the person is not a sinner and his act is pardoned, as this hadith demonstrates. There are also other proofs that demonstrate that Allah does not hold one to account for the mistakes that he makes. For example, Allah says in the Quran, in a verse mentioned above, “Allah does not burden any soul beyond what it can bear. For it is what it gains and against it what it earns. O our Lord, do not hold us to account if we forget or make a mistake” (al-Baqara 286).

It is recorded in· Sahih Muslim that Allah responded favorably to this supplication. Allah also says “There is no sin on you concerning that in which you made a mistake, but only in regard to what your hearts deliberately intended. And Allah is Ever Oft Forgiving, Most Merciful” (al Ahzaab 5).

Umar ibn al-Khattaab is quoted as saying, “I do not fear mistakes for you but I fear for you what [you do] intentionally.”‘ Al-Hasan al-Basri is reported to have said, “If it were not for what Allah has said about the affair of those two men- meaning David and Solomon- I would have been of the opinion that the judges are destroyed. But Allah has praised one for his deed and the other for his personal reasoning (ijtihaad).” He was referring to the following verse of the Quran,

And remember David and Solomon when they gave judgment in the case of the field in which the sheep of certain people had pastured at night. And We were witnesses to their judgment. And We made Solomon understand [the case]; and to each of them We gave right judgment and knowledge. And We subjected the mountains and the birds to glorify Our Praises along with David … ” (al-Anbiyaa 78-79)

A person who is doing an act mistakenly still has the qualities of being living, adult and sane; thus, committing mistakes does not free oneself completely from being a responsible agent. Therefore, none of the shareeah obligations are completely dropped from him simply because he has made a mistake. Again, however, he is considered one who was not completely capable of fulfilling his responsibilities at the time of his being mistaken.

3.1 Does the Pardoning of Mistakes Include Mistakes Concerning Matters that are Considered Definitive?

In general, all matters can be divided into two broad categories: qati ‘ee or issues that are known in a definitive manner and dhanni or issues that are known in a probable manner. A definitive (qati ‘ee) matter is a conclusion of a definitive nature. In general, this definitive conclusion is the result of clear and unquestionable evidence. Hence, there is virtually no room for any other plausible opinion. Dhanni, as opposed to qati ‘ee, is a conclusion based on the preponderance of the evidence that does not reach the level of certainty. The major difference between qati ‘ee and dhanni is the existence of some evidence or quasi-evidence that lends support to an opposing opinion in the case of dhanni matters. In the case of qati ‘ee matters, there is no real acceptable evidence or quasi-evidence for any opposing opinion. Dhanni matters are open to personal juristic reasoning and, hence, there is more room for difference of opinion concerning them.

The majority of the scholars accept that fact that mistakes made concerning dhanni matters are definitely overlooked and forgiven by Allah. This opinion is partially based on the hadith under discussion here, “Allah has pardoned for my Nation … ” It is also based on the following hadith of the Prophet (peace be upon him) “If a judge makes a decision by exerting himself and he finds what is correct, he receives two rewards. If he exerts himself and makes a mistake, he gets one reward.” (Recorded by al-Bukhari and Muslim.) This hadith states that even if the person is incorrect, he will still be rewarded for the effort that he made-­ not to speak of being held sinless for his mistake.

Ibn Taimiya points out that some conditions must be met for this to be true. These are as follows:
(1) The person must have had a sincere intention to follow the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him).
(2) He must have exerted himself to the best of his ability in an effort to determine the truth or correct position on the matter.
(3) His decision must have been based on some evidence of the shareeah, even though he may not have been aware that such evidence was not valid or there was stronger evidence against it and so forth.

The most that can be asked of a person is that he intends to follow the truth, he seeks the truth to the best of his ability and he bases his decisions and actions on knowledge. lbn Taimiya cites the case of a person who knows the command and exhortation to pray but is unaware of the specific prohibition concerning prayers at certain times. When such a person prays at those times which is a wrong or mistaken act on his part- he will not be held sinful if he had the right intention and acted based on the knowledge that he had.

The question arises concerning issues of a definitive nature: Is there any excuse for those people who make mistakes in this realm although the evidences concerning them are clear and unquestionable? Are those who make mistakes in this realm considered sinful? On this point, there are a number of scholars who say that there is no room for mistakes on such issues and that those who do make such mistakes are sinful. For example, the Hanbali legal theorist Abu Yala wrote, “As for the matter that has definitive evidences for it, we know that it is correct, we are definite that the one who disagrees with us on it is wrong, we void his ruling and we rule him to be a sinner.” Al-Khateeb al-Baghdaadi also said about such issues, “The one who goes against it is a sinner,faasiq (evildoer).”

Another view is that if a sincere, Muslim scholar makes a mistake in matters of a definitive nature, he will be forgiven and he is not to be considered sinful. Ibn Hazm and ibn Taimiya ascribe this opinion to the early scholars of Islam and the Imams such as Abu Hanifah, al-Shafi’ee and al-Thauri. The proofs they present for this opinion are numerous and convincing. They include, among others, the following verse mentioned above, “Allah does not burden any soul beyond what it can bear. For it is what it gains and against it what it earns. 0 our Lord, do not hold us to account if we forget or make a mistake” (al-Baqara 286). Again, in Sahih Muslim, it is stated that Allah has positively responded to this supplication. This verse makes no distinction between mistakes related to qati ‘ee issues or dhanni issues.

There is also a hadith recorded by al-Bukhari and Muslim in which a man who had not performed good deeds during his lifetime feared Allah’s punishment. He told his children to burn his body and scatter his ashes in the ocean after he dies. The reason he did that was that he feared Allah’s
punishment. Due to that strong fear of Allah, Allah showed mercy to him and forgave his sins. In this incident, the man believed that he could escape Allah’s punishment by having his ashes scattered. To believe that Allah has not the power to reconstruct and punish a person simply because he has been burnt and his ashes scattered is a mistake concerning a definitive matter. However, Allah still forgave that person.

On this point, ibn Taimiya wrote, Whoever goes against what is confirmed in the Book or the sunnah is either a disbeliever, an evildoer, a sinner- or he could be a believer who exercised his j udgment and was wrong and he will be rewarded for exercising his judgment and forgiven for his mistake. That would be the case if the knowledge that would establish the proof against him did not reach him. Allah has said, “We were not inflicting punishment until We sent a messenger” (al-Israa 15). However, if the proof is established against him as demonstrated by the Book and the sunnah and he differs from it, then he is to be punished for that, either killed [if he is an apostate] or something less than that.

The conclusion is that Allah’s mercy is so great that He even forgives those of the followers of Muhammad (peace be upon him) who commit errors concerning matters of a definitive nature. In addition, a Muslim does not automatically become an apostate, a heretic or even an evildoer (jaasiq) due to a mistake that he has made, even though the act he performed or statement he made is one of disbelief, intransigence or a heresy. It is only after his mistake has been made evidently clear to him and he then continues to insist on following what clearly goes against the way of the Prophet (peace be upon him) and the believers may he be declared an apostate or a heretic.

This does not mean that the door is to be left open to anyone to state any opinion even if it goes against the Quran or sunnah. Allah’s forgiveness for those who are mistaken does not mean that one remains silent in the face of the mistakes of others. Instead, one must still advise them and show them their errors based on evidence from the Quran and sunnah. Depending on the nature or gravity of their errors, one may even be forced to go beyond advice, as can be seen in the example of the Companions who were forced to fight each other when they felt that the wrong opinion of the other group was a threat to Islam itself. It does however mean that mistakes in themselves do not necessarily require that a person be condemned in either this life or the Hereafter.

4. “[what is done] out of forgetfulness”

“Forgetfulness” (al-nisyaan) has been defined by the scholars in numerous ways. Hasan has given the following definitions from some of the standard works on Islamic legal theory: Ignorance by necessity, and not on account of ailment, of what a person used to know, despite his having knowledge of other things … Failure to recall a thing at the time of its need … A circumstance which befalls a man without his volition causing loss of remembrance of something.

An aspect that is stressed in the definitions of “forgetfulness” is that it is a temporary situation not caused by disease. It is not, for example, like amnesia, senility or anything of that nature. Indeed, the person is fully competent but some matter has slipped his mind at that particular time while, perhaps even in just a few moments, the person will be fully aware of the matter that he had temporarily forgotten.

4.1 More Details About Mistakes and Forgetfulness

The results of an act done unintentionally or by mistake or an omission of an act due to forgetfulness may differ depending on the nature of the actal though in all cases the person is considered free of sin. Al-Bugha and Mistu divide the cases into the four categories below. Their classification is according to the Shafi’ ee application of this hadith.

(1) If a person unintentionally failed to perform an obligatory act, then he is still obliged to perform that obligatory act and he has not been resolved of that responsibility. One example of this nature has been given concerning obligatory prayer. Another example is a person giving his zakat to another person thinking that the other person was impoverished. It the receiver at was actually of ample means, the one who gave that money has not fulfilled his obligation of zakat.

He must still give his zakat to the right receivers. At the same time, though, he may demand his money back from the wrongful recipient. Another example is where a person, forgetting that he has water, makes tayammum instead of ablution. In that case, according to al-Bugha and Mistu, when he remembers he has water, he must perform the proper ablution and repeat any prayers he performed after making tayammum. To the above category, the following example may be added from ibn Rajah: If a person prays while forgetting that he was not in a state of ablution, then he must perform ablution and repeat that prayer when he remembers that fact. The exception to the above is where the missed deed can no longer be performed. For example, if a person forgot the Friday Prayer, he cannot perform the Friday Prayer on his own (although he does perform the Dhuhr Prayer).

(2) If, due to a mistake or forgetfulness, a person performs a forbidden act that does not involve the destruction of any property or wealth or a violation of rights, then there is no punishment or penalty upon him. For example, if a person drinks an alcoholic beverage believing that it was not alcoholic, there is no sin upon him nor is there any punishment for him. Similarly, if a pilgrim wears stitched clothing or cologne out of forgetfulness, there is no penalty or sin.

(3) If, due to a mistake or forgetfulness, a person performs a forbidden act that does involve the destruction of any property or wealth or a violation of rights, then he is responsible for the act he has committed. For example, if a pilgrim hunts and kills an animal, either forgetting that he is in the state of pilgrimage or out of ignorance of the ruling, he must still perform the expiation for the act that he has committed. Commenting on this, Hasan wrote,

Forgetfulness forms no excuse if the act done results from it and affects private rights. If a man destroys or damages another person’s property through forgetfulness, he will be held liable to pay compensation for it. The reason is that a man’s rights are inviolable for the general need of the people. Therefore, the culpability of the person violating them will not be considered. The inviolability of a man’s rights is not negated by forgetfulness. On the contrary, forgetfulness forms a valid excuse in matters which are purely the right of God. The rights of God are meant for the trial (ibtila’) of man so that he may show his obedience to Him. God does not stand in need of man’s acts, whether they are words or deeds. God is
independent of all creatures. Since the acts of worship require intention (qasd) but forgetfulness annihilates intention, hence forgetfulness forms an excuse in respect of rights of God.

lbn Humaid further points out that if a person were not held responsible for his acts against others done out of forgetfulness or mistake, it would cause a great deal of hardship and destroy the interests of the people. Indeed, it might lead to anarchy. People could destroy others’ properties and then claim that it was due to a mistake or some aspect of forgetfulness. Making people responsible for such actions should make them more prudent in their actions.

(4) If a person performs an act unintentionally or out of forgetfulness that would normally require a prescribed punishment, that aspect of nonintention or forgetfulness would be sufficient to remove the punishment from him. However, he may have to fulfill other requirements that are different from the prescribed punishment (as in the case of mistakenly killing another believer, discussed below) There are some areas where the ruling for forgetfulness and mistakes differ.

With respect to mistakes, it seems that the previously mentioned Shafi’ ee approach needs amendment. In a matter of ijtihaad (personal juristic reasoning) if a qualified person exerts himself to the best of his ability to determine some matter and then it turns out that he was mistaken, he is not required to amend for that act. Such is the case, for example, when a person tries his best to determine the direction of the qibla. If, afterwards, it is determined that he prayed in the wrong direction, he is not required to repeat his prayer. Similarly, if a person makes a ruling or a judge makes a decision based on all the information available to him and does his best to come to the right conclusion, he is not held responsible if his decision is mistaken.

4.2 Two Approaches to Forgetfulness

The above discussion elaborates one widely accepted approach (emphasized by the Shafi’ees) to forgetfulness: if one forgets a deed, he still has to make up that deed; if one out of forgetfulness does something wrong or invalidates a deed, there is no harm and the forgetfulness is considered inconsequential.

Sometimes the surrounding environment may induce one to forget something while at other times the surrounding situation should keep one from forgetting something. For example, being in prayer in congregation has enough of a special feeling that one should not do something like eat out of forgetfulness. However, if one is praying the Noon Prayer and is sitting after the second rakah, it would not be shocking for him to forget that he was in the second instead of the fourth rakah and then to make the tasleem signifying the end of the prayer. Many scholars, in particular the Hanafis, would consider the latter case excusable but not the former case. There are other cases in which there is nothing special to remind the person and keep him from forgetting nor is there anything to lead him to forget. In these cases, it seems that the rule of overlooking the act done through forgetfulness takes precedence.

Notice that this implies two somewhat distinct- although at times overlapping- approaches to forgetfulness. Both of these approaches have some clear evidences in the hadith of the Prophet (peace be upon him). For example, one hadith states, “Whoever forgets a prayer must pray it when he remembers it. And there is no expiation for it except that.” (Recorded by al-Bukhari and Muslim.) This supports the view that if one forgets an obligatory act, one must still perform that act upon recalling it.

Another hadith states, “Whoever forgets and eats or drinks while he is fasting should complete his fast for it was only Allah who fed him or gave him drink.” (Recorded by alBukhari and Muslim.) This hadith is used to support the view that under some circumstances forgetfulness is excused because there were no reinforcing aspects that should keep a person from forgetting.

4.3 When is Forgetfulness Not an Excuse?

Al-Bugha and Mistu point out that if a person is himself the cause of his own forgetfulness or of an act that he could have avoided, then he is not excused. In other words, if he could have taken the steps to prevent his forgetfulness or the ensuing act, then he is not excused. One example they give is that of a person who sees something impure on his clothing but he takes his time in removing it, to the point that he forgets it is there. If he later prays with that same impurity on his clothing, he will not be excused, as it was due to his own lack of action. Hence, he will be required to make up those prayers upon realizing what he has done.

Similarly, al-Raazi wrote, “If a person is heedless concerning the study and repetition [of what he has memorized of the Quran] to the point that he forgets [what he had memorized], he will be blameworthy. However, if he continually practiced his recitation but after that he forgot what he had memorized, in that case, he will be excused. “

The Hanafi legal theorist, al-Bazdawi also wrote, Forgetfulness is an excuse according to the right of the shareeah only if it were not due to heedlessness. Otherwise, it is not an excuse, as it was not an excuse in the case of Adam (peace be upon him) or the one who forgets what he had memorized of the Quran while he had the ability to study it over and over. Such things occurred due to his own shortcoming and, therefore, they can be acceptable causes for punishment.

5. “[what is done] under duress”

Hasan has given the following definitions for ikraah (duress, coercion): Coercion or duress (ikraah) means to urge another person to perform that to which he does not consent, and that which he would not choose to perform personally in a direct manner if he were left alone … Coercion or duress (ikraah) means to urge a man by another man to perform an act which he dislikes, and which he would not intend to perform personally in a direct manner if he were not urged on it by threat.

Coercion, therefore, involves both a dislike for the act by the one being coerced as well as being forced to perform that act. Hence, it is a case where the person, if left to his own volition, would not perform a specific act. However, due to coercion from others, he performs the act “against his will”. His intention is not actually to perform the act itself but to avert the threatened punishment; if not for the coercion, the act would not have been carried out.

For there to be a true case of coercion, four components must be
(1) The one who doing the coercing (al-mukrih)
(2) The coerced (al-mukrah)
(3) The threat of the one doing the coercion (al-mukrah bih)
(4) The act that one is being coerced to perform (al-mukrah alaih)

For example, Mr. X says to Mr. Y, “Divorce your wife or I will kill you.” In
this case, the one doing the coercing is Mr. X. Mr. Y is the coerced. The threat is the threat of death. The act being coerced is the divorce of Mr. Y’s wife. Each of these four components has some important aspects to them. Therefore, they shall each be discussed separately in brief.

The One Doing the Coercing (al-mukrih): The most important condition concerning the one doing the coercing is that he have the ability to carry out what he is threatening. Actually, it is sufficient for the coerced to believe (with reason) that the one doing the coercing has such an ability. If the coercing person actually has no ability (or cannot reasonably be believed to be able) to carry out his threat, then it cannot be considered coercion.

It seems that it was Abu Hanifah’s opinion, as well as Ahmad’s according to one narration, that the only one who is in a position to coerce anybody else is the ruler. This is because he is the only one considered to have the ability to implement the threat he has made. However, the majority of scholars, including Abu Hanifah’s leading students, are of the opinion that anyone who has the ability to carry out a threat qualifies.

The difference of opinion on this question has been explained by the fact that during the time of Abu Hanifah it was, in reality, only the ruler who could make a dangerous threat and then carry it out. No one else could do such a thing because the control of the Islamic government was quite strong and the government would punish or deter anyone else from doing such a thing. In later times, when things changed, others were able to make such threats without much fear of being punished by the government. Hence, later Hanafi scholars changed the school’s view on this issue and said that the malicious threat of anyone, the ruler or otherwise, who has the ability to carry out the threat qualifies as coercion or duress.

The Coerced ( al-mukrah): There are certain conditions that the coerced person must meet. First, he must not be pleased with or willing to do the act that he is being urged to do. In fact, if he shows any sign of pleasure or willingness to perform the act, he will not be considered coerced.
Second, he must have reason to believe that the one doing the coercing has the ability to carry out his threat. Third, he must not have the ability to defend himself from the one coercing him or his threat. If he does have the ability to ward off the threat or he can possibly flee from the situation or get help from others, he is not considered coerced.

The Threat Involved: There is a difference of opinion among the scholars as to whether a threat in and of itself is sufficient to put the threatened into a state of coercion. If a threat is made in conjunction with an immediate punishment, such as being beaten, imprisoned, and so forth, it is considered a true threat and the person involved is being coerced. According to the Hanafis, Malikis, Shafi’ees and one narration from Ahmad, a threat in itself is sufficient for coercion. Another narration from Ahmad states that the threat must be combined with some type of initial punishment. It seems that the strongest opinion is that of the majority, that a plausible threat in itself is sufficient for a case of coercion.

Shaqra’s Conclusions: After reviewing the four schools imams approach concerning the threat that coerces a person into performing an act, Shaqra has made the following conclusions:
(1) Although the schools describe the threat in various ways, their opinions concerning what constitutes a threat that leads to coercion are very similar and compatible. In general, the threat must be of such a great harm that it makes the coerced person afraid enough to perform the coerced act in order to rescue himself from the situation he is facing.
(2) There is no clear text of the Quran or sunnah that defines or gives the parameters of the kind of threat that counts as coercion in the shareeah. However, examples from the Prophet’s lifetime, such as the suffering that took place in Makkah, and some of the Prophet’s (peace be upon him) statements, one can approximately derive the nature of threat. For example, the Arabic words used in the present hadith translated as, “under duress,” imply a situation in which a person is doing something that he dislikes while being forced or pressured into doing it. The following has also been narrated from some of the Companions: Umar ibn al-Khattaab said, “A man cannot control himself if I starve him, tie him up or beat him.” Abdullah ibn Masood said, “If a person in power wants to force me to say something and he beats me once or twice, I will say what he has asked.

(3) The case of coercion differs depending on the person being coerced, the nature of the threat, and the weight of the threat as compared to that of the thing being demanded. Some people are able to withstand much more than others, so that one person would be considered coerced in some cases whereas someone else in a similar situation would not. Similarly, what his being threatened must be greater in harm than the act requested. If such is not the case, it cannot be considered a case of coercion.

5.1 The Act One is Being Coerced to Perform

The scholars argue that coercion does not destroy legal capacity and responsibility. This means that even in cases of coercion, there are certain rulings by which the person must abide. If he does not do so, he would be considered a sinner. For example, if a person is threatened with death if he does not drink wine, it becomes obligatory upon him to drink that wine. If he does not do so and allows himself to be killed simply to avoid drinking wine, he would be considered a sinner as his shareeah obligation at that time was to drink the wine. This is because the obligation to preserve one’s life outweighs the sin of drinking alcohol.

For there to be a true case of coercion, either the act the person is being forced to perform must be something forbidden or he must be threatened with something forbidden. For example, if the heirs of a person who was killed say to the killer, “We will not invoke the law of retaliation against you if you divorce your wife,” that would not be a case of coercion. This is because he is free to divorce his wife if he wants to. In that case, he is simply making a choice to do a permissible act in order to avoid another permissible choice that he wishes to avoid. The rules and principles of coercion would not apply in such a case.

Furthermore, the scholars distinguish between cases in which one is compelled to do something that is right and correct and cases in which one is compelled to do something forbidden. ‘ For example, if a judge compels someone to sell off part of his property in order to pay off his debts, such is not considered a case of coercion and the principles discussed herein do not apply to such a case, since the payment of the debt is a righteous act. Given the above points, the acts that one may be coerced into performing are divided into three categories:

(1) Those acts that one is forbidden to perform even while under coercion.
(2) Those acts that one is required to perform while under coercion.
(3) Those acts that one is allowed to perform under coercion, though it is considered better and more virtuous for the person to abstain from them. In such cases, the permissibility of a normally forbidden act is known as rukhsah or concession due to special circumstances. Examples from each of these categories will be given in the “Related Fiqh Issues” section.

5.2 Accountability for the Coerced Act

The Hanafi and majority approach also differ with respect to accountability of the coerced act. This is an important question as it is the responsible person who is going to have to face the worldly consequences of the coerced forbidden act.

To understand the majority view on this point, one has to keep in mind the above distinction between acts that are permissible, forbidden or a concession under cases of coercion. An act which remains forbidden in a case of coercion will be attributed to both the person who actually performed the act and the one doing the coercing. The coerced, from a legal point of view, had no right to perform the act. The one doing the coercing is also to blame for his coercion led to the act in the first place. Hence, they share in the responsibility of the act, though the punishment for each may differ given that one was the actual cause and the other was being coerced.

If the coerced act falls under the category of what is generally legal for the coerced to perform and is the nature of a transaction or contract, the coercion will render the transaction legally void; in other words, it will not be ascribed to the doer at all. For example, if a person is coerced to divorce his wife, marry a woman or sell a specific item, that divorce, marriage or sale would not be legally binding, since the person had no real intention to make that transaction; so the law would consider it as if the act never took place.

If the coerced act falls under the category of concession for the coerced, then the act will be attributed to the one doing the coercing. For example, if a person’s life is threatened unless he destroys someone else’s property, he is allowed to destroy the other person’s property, and the one responsible for the act will be the one doing the coercing. Hence, he is the one who will have to pay the damages for the person whose property was damaged.

The Hanafi perspective differs greatly from the above majority perspective. To understand their view, one must first divide the topic of coerced acts into: dispositions (tasarrufaat), admissions (iqraaraat) and acts. With respect to dispositions, they must also be divided into two categories: those dispositions that may be revoked or annulled and those which may not be revoked or annulled. In general, sales, leasing and other similar types of business transactions may be annulled. Marriage, divorce, freeing of slaves and other dispositions are irrevocable.

According to the Hanafi perspective, revocable dispositions done under coercion are considered “defective” (jaasid). In other words, they are not completely valid because they are lacking the complete consent of the one who was coerced. If he later, after the period of coercion, approves of the disposition, the disposition will be considered sound and binding.

Those acts which are irrevocable are completely binding and sound even if done under duress according to the Hanafis. In this case, these acts are completely dependent upon the will of the person and not on his consent. He willed to make the statement of that disposition- even though he willed it simply to avoid the threatened punishment- and, therefore, it is legally effective. Hanafi scholars make an analogy between the one who says something in jest and the one who is coerced. In the case of the one who says something in jest, he did not desire the resultant legal effect but he did will the statement or disposition. If such a disposition is binding on the one who says something in jest, the Hanafis argue, it must also be binding on the one who is coerced to do such an act.

For the Hanafis, admissions are not acceptable if they are the result of coercion. This is because the goal of admissions is the ascertain of what is true while such is negated in the case of admitting to something solely to avoid a threat. With respect to acts done by the coerced, the Hanafis divide such acts into two categories:
(1) acts in which the coerced person can truly be considered simply the instrument or tool of the one doing the coercing and
(2) acts in which the coerced cannot be considered simply the instrument of the one doing the coercing.

The first type is also subdivided into two categories. The Hanafis distinguish between cases where attributing the act to the one who is doing the coercing (and considering the coerced simply his instrument) will change the subject matter of the offense (mahall al-jinaahyah) and where it will not. If the subject matter of the offense will be changed by attributing the act to the one doing the coercing, that would, in essence, bring an end to any form of coercion for coercion is an attempt to harm another person by making him do something that he does not will to do. Hasan has given the following example to illustrate this point,

For instance, if a person in the state of ihraam (pilgrim sanctity) compells [sic] another person in a state of ihraam (pilgrim sanctity) to kill a game and he kills it, the legal effect of this offence will be confined to the coerced or doer. He will be liable for violating the sacred state. The reason is that the coercer [sic] intended to harm him by compelling him to violate his own sacred state. If the act of the coerced is imputed to the coercer and he (the doer) is treated as the instrument of the coercer, he (i.e., the coercer) will be responsible for violation of the sacred state- a change in the character of the subject matter. In other words, the coercer wanted to harm the coerced by compelling him to violate his own sacred state and then bear the legal consequences. But by imputing the act to the coercer, he (the coercer) himself will have to bear the legal consequences. In this manner, the coercion itself will be annulled.

If such change in the subject matter of the offence does not occur when the coerced person is simply considered an instrument of coercion and the coercion is constraining, the act will be attributed to the one doing the coercing and not to the coerced. So, if under coercion, one man destroys another man’s property, the act will be attributed to the one doing the coercing and he will be responsible for the damage.

If the coercion was not constraining, the coerced person will be considered responsible for the act and not the one doing the coercing. This is because he has, in essence, made the free choice to perform that act. According to the Hanafis, also, there are some coerced acts in which the coerced person could never be considered simply the instrument of the one doing the coercing. This category includes the acts of eating, drinking and sexual intercourse. Their argument is that it is inconceivable to imagine one person forcing another person to do those acts; for example, a man cannot eat with somebody else’s mouth. In those cases, the act will be attributed to the coerced person and the aspect of coercion will have no legal affect whatsoever. Therefore, if a fasting person is coerced to eat, it will be concluded that he himself broke his fast and not the person who coerced him to do so.

6. Related Fiqh Issues

6.1 Missing a Prayer Due to Forgetfulness or Mistake

If a person forgets one of the five daily prayers, then he is not considered sinful. However, he must perform that missed prayer as soon as he has realized what has happened. The Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) stated, “Whoever forgets a prayer must pray it when he remembers it. And there is no expiation for it except that.” (Recorded by al-Bukhari and Muslim.)

In this example, the fact that the person is not sinful can be derived from this hadith, “Allah has pardoned for my Nation … ” The fact that the prayer must be made up is based on a separate piece of evidence, the hadith quoted above. Hence, this example sheds no light on the difficult question discussed earlier: Does this hadith, “Allah has pardoned for my Nation … ” imply only the sin or the sin and the worldly ruling?

6.2 Mistakenly Killing Another Muslim

If a Muslim kills another Muslim by mistake, such as in an attempt to kill a non-Muslim during battle, there is no sin upon him. In other words, Allah will not hold him to account for it in the Hereafter. However, that does not mean that he is not required to do anything due to that grave act. He still must perform an act of expiation for that mistake. This is due– and Allah knows best- to the great sanctity of human life. It may also serve as a protection against reckless killings in which the killer denies any responsibility toward the deceased and his family. Concerning this matter, Allah says in the Quran,

“It is not for a believer to kill a believer except by mistake. And whoever kills a believer by mistake, then the freeing of a believing slave and a compensation blood-money payment presented to his family [is required], unless they give it up as charity [on their part]. But if he [the killed] were from a people at war with you and he was a believer, then [there is only] the freeing of a believing slave. And if he were from a people with whom you have a treaty, then a compensation payment presented to his family and the freeing of a believing slave. And whoever does not find one, then [instead] a fast of two consecutive months, [seeking] acceptance of repentance from Allah. And Allah is ever knowing and wise” (al-Nisaa 92).

6.3 Forgetting to Mention Allah’s Name Upon Slaughtering an Animal

According to al-Shafi’ee, some Malikis and a narration from Ahmad, to mention the name of Allah upon slaughtering an animal is simply a recommended act. Therefore, according to this view, if a person does not mention Allah’s name either intentionally or out of forgetfulness, there is no problem and the meat is still considered permissible to eat. According to Abu Hanifah, Malik and a better known narration from Ahmad, the mentioning of Allah’s name is a condition or an obligation for the permissibility of the meat. Their argument rests mostly on the understanding of verse 121 of Surah al-Anaam, quoted below. However, these scholars agree that if a person slaughters an animal with the intention of slaughtering it properly but forgets to mention the name of Allah upon slaughtering, the meat is still considered permissible to eat.

There were some scholars who were of the opinion that if a person does not mention Allah’s name, either intentionally or out of forgetfulness, the animal is not permissible to be eaten. These scholars included Muhammad ibn Seereen, Abdullah ibn Umar, al-Shabi, Abu Thaur and Dawood ibn Ali. They base their opinion on the express meaning of the verse, “And do not eat of that over which the name of Allah has not been mentioned, for it is indeed grave disobedience” (al-Anaam 121).

They also support their opinion by stating that under such circumstances, there is no call for a person to forget to mention the name of Allah. However, this argument can be answered that if the person is not an experienced butcher, the nervousness and excitement of the situation may cause him to forget to mention the name of Allah. After discussing five different opinions on this question (the above three as well as two other minor opinions), al-Jaboori concludes that if an inexperienced person slaughters an animal and forgets to mention the name of Allah, it is permissible to eat that meat. However, if an experienced butcher forgets to mention the name of Allah, it is not allowed to eat such an animal.

It could also be argued that a butcher slaughters a large number of animals on a regular basis. Therefore, it should not be surprising if he occasionally forgets to mention Allah’s name. Hence, one could argue, his forgetting to mention Allah’s name should be excused. However, it seems that the strongest view would be that, if the mentioning of Allah’s name is a condition for the permissibility of the meat slaughtered, the slaughtered animal is permissible to be eaten if the person, an experienced butcher or otherwise, simply forgot to mention Allah’s name upon slaughtering the animal. This conclusion is not based on this hadith, “Allah has pardoned for my Nation .. .,” since that hadith is only in relation to any sin in the Hereafter.

Instead, it is based on the Quranic verse above, “And do not eat of that which the name of Allah has not been mentioned, for indeed, it is grave disobedience” (al-Anaam 121), as an act done out of forgetfulness is never termed “grave disobedience”. Hence, the verse is not referring to such a case. Allah knows best.

6.4 Speaking During the Prayer Out of Forgetfulness

The scholars are agreed that it is not allowed to speak during the prayer except for the words of the prayer or to correct the Imam when he makes a mistake. However, the scholars differ concerning one who speaks out of forgetfulness or due to ignorance of its prohibition. According to the Hanafis, speech is forbidden during the prayer in all of its forms, intentional or unintentional. Their view is based on the clear hadith recorded by al-Bukhari and Muslim stating that the Companions used to speak during the prayer until verse 238 of surah al-Baqara was revealed. After that time, no form of non-prayer speaking was allowed. As for this hadith, “Allah has pardoned for my Nation [what is done] by mistake, out of forgetfulness or under duress,” they argue that it only removes the sin of the act and not the ruling of it invalidating the prayer.

According to the Shafi’ees3 and Malikis, talking during the prayer out of forgetfulness does not invalidate the prayer. Inadvertent or unintentional speech is not what is forbidden by the above mentioned verse. (It should be noted that they do distinguish between a lot of speech and a little bit of speech.) Both of the above views have been narrated from Ahmad.

According to ali-Bisaam, the evidence for the opinion that speech does not invalidate the prayer is strong. Muslim records a hadith in which one of the Companions said, “May Allah have mercy on you” to another person who sneezed during the prayer. After the prayer, the Prophet (peace be upon him) stated that it is not proper to have any worldly or mundane speech in the prayer. However, he did not order him to repeat the prayer.

Another proof for this view is the “hadith of Dhu-1-Yadain,” recorded by al-Bukhari and Muslim, in which the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) performed only two rakats of a four rakat prayer. Dhu-l-Yadain informed the Prophet (peace be upon him) of that happening. The Prophet (peace be upon him) asked the people whether or not Dhu-l-Yadain was correct. When the Prophet (peace be upon him) was told that he had only prayed two rakats, he simply performed two more rakats to make a total of four. Hence, he did not consider his prayer invalidated due to his speaking, as otherwise he would have performed the entire four rakats over again.5 This hadith is clear evidence that one who speaks out of forgetfulness or ignorance does not invalidate his prayer.

It should be noted that the first hadith ali-Bisaam referred to is irrelevant as it was obviously a case of ignorance and not a case of forgetfulness; the rulings for ignorance are not exactly the same as those for forgetfulness. The hadith of Dhu-1-Yadain is a much stronger proof. It is an argument a fortiori (“arguing from an accepted conclusion to an even more evident one”) in other words, if all of that speech of the Prophet (peace be upon him) and Dhu-1-Yadain did not invalidate his prayer, then, obviously, speaking a few words or such out of forgetfulness should not invalidate a person’s prayer.

6.5 Eating, Drinking or Sexual Intercourse Out of Forgetfulness While Fasting Ramadhaan

The majority of the scholars are of the opinion that if a person forgets that he is fasting and eats something, then, as soon as he remembers that he was fasting, he must stop eating and fast the rest of the day. His eating by mistake did not invalidate his fast nor does he have to make that day of fasting up at a later date. This opinion is based on the following hadith of the Prophet (peace be upon him): “Whoever forgets and eats or drinks while he is fasting should complete his fast for it was only Allah who fed him or gave him to drink.” (Recorded by alBukhari and Muslim)

According to Malik, the person who eats out of forgetfulness must make that day up at a later date although there is no other form of expiation he must make. He is like one who has forgotten a prayer. In this case, though, it seems that the view of the majority is the correct opinion. This is because there is another hadith that states, “For whoever breaks his fast during Ramadhaan out of forgetfulness there is no making up of that day or expiation [upon him].“(Recorded by al-Haakim)

This hadith also implies that if a person has sexual intercourse with his wife due to forgetfulness, he does not violate his fast and does not have to make the day up later. This is the opinion of Abu Hanifah and al-Shafi’ee. However, on this point, Ahmad disagrees with them and says that in this case the person must make up that day later. There is even a narration from him that such a person must also perform the expiation for that act. The hadith just quoted would be an argument against Ahmad on this issue, since it states, “Whoever breaks his fast…,” implying breaking it out of forgetfulness in any way, whether by eating, drinking or having sexual intercourse with one’s wife.

6.6 Making Acts or Stating Words of Unbelief While Under Duress

One may only resort to statements or actions of unbelief while under constraining coercion. Acts or statements of kufr (unbelief) are the greatest sins possible. Hence, the ruling concerning them must be much stricter than the rulings concerning eating pork, drinking alcohol and so forth. For example, if a person is threatened with a beating from which he does not fear death or if he only fears being ridiculed or abused, such is not enough for him to resort to acts or statements of kufr. Under circumstances of a lesser threat, one must remain patient and cannot resort to making statements or actions of unbelief.

If a person is forced to utter statements of unbelief, he should try to make an ambiguous statement that may only imply disbelief, making the one doing the coercing believe that he has stated words of disbelief. If the person is forced to utter statements of explicit unbelief, then he may make such statements with his tongue only while his heart is firm with faith. In such a case, he will not be held responsible for the words he has stated. Allah says in the Quran, “Whoever disbelieves in .Allah after his belief [shall earn the wrath of Allah] except for one who is forced [to renounce his religion] while his heart is secure in faith. But those who [willingly] open their breasts to disbelief, upon them is wrath from Allah, and for them is a great punishment” (al-Nahl 106).

There is some difference of opinion as to whether this concession is confined to only statements of unbelief or includes both statements and actions of unbelief. There seems to be general agreement, based on the Quranic verse above, someone may resort to making statements of unbelief as a way of saving his life. The difference of opinion is only concerning actions. For example, if someone were threatened with death unless he prostrated to an idol, would it then be permissible for him to make such a prostration? It has been narrated from ibn Abbaas, Abu al-Aaliyah, Abu al-Shathaa, al-Rabee ibn Anas, al-Dhahhaak and Suhnoon that such deception can only be in statements and not in actions. This is also stated in one narration from Ahmad.

Al-Hasan al-Basri was asked about a person who was told, “Prostrate to an idol or we will kill you.” He replied, “If the idol were in the direction of the qiblah, then he should prostrate and make his intention for sake of Allah. If it is not in the direction of the qiblah, he should not do it, even if they kill him.” However, ibn Atiyyah said, “What should prevent him from making his intention for Allah even if it is not in the direction of the qiblah? In the Book of Allah, it states, ‘Any which way you turn, there is the Face of Allah’ [al Baqara 115]. In the Law, it is permissible for the traveler to perform voluntary prayers not in the direction of the qiblah.”

It seems that there is no strong evidence to make a distinction between statements of unbelief and acts of unbelief while under constraining duress. Either of them may be resorted to in order to save one’s life as long as one’s heart is content and filled with true faith. Such seems to be the strongest conclusion and the opinion of the majority of the scholars. Allah knows best. Al-Bugha and Mistu point out that if the person can persevere and endure the harm coming to him, it is better for him not to utter any word of disbelief. If he dies due to refusing to utter words of disbelief, he will die as a martyr. Shaqra states that there is a consensus on that point.

There are many examples from the Makkan stage of the life of the Prophet (peace be upon him) that demonstrate that one is allowed to refuse to state words of unbelief even in the face of great torture. Such was the case with Bilaal ibn Ribaah, Suhaib al-Roomi, Saalim and others. The family of Yaasir was also greatly punished, with both parents dying due to the torture, but they refused to give into the demands of the unbelievers.

The following hadith also demonstrates the virtue of holding to the religion and not bowing down to the pressures to commit unbelief even in the face of death. During the early years of the message, when the Muslims were facing great hardship from the unbelievers, the Muslims complained to the Prophet (peace be upon him) and said, “Shall you not seek help for us and pray for us [for our situation to change]?”

The Prophet (peace be upon him) said in response, “Among those who were before you, they would take a man and dig a ditch for him in the earth. They would put him in the ditch and then bring a saw and put it upon his head. They would cut him into two pieces. His flesh would be combed with iron combs and removed from his bones. However, all of that would not cause him to revert from his religion. By Allah, this matter will be completed until a traveler can ride from Sana to Hadhramaut and not fear anything except Allah and, concerning his sheep, the wolves. But you people are certainly hasty.”

In Sahih al-Bukhari, al-Bukhari has a chapter entitled, “Whoever chooses beating, being killed and being disgraced over [being forced to commit] unbelief.” The first hadith that he presents in that chapter is, “[There are] three characteristics that if a person has them, he has tasted the sweetness of faith: that Allah and His Messenger are more beloved to him than anything else; that he loves a person and he only loves him for the sake of
Allah; and that he hates to return to unbelief in the same way that he hates to be thrown into the Fire.” Commenting on this hadith and al-Bukhari’s placement of it in his Sahih, ibn Hajr wrote that the hadith equates returning to unbelief with being thrown into the Fire. Being beaten, killed or disgraced is easier upon a believer than being thrown into the Fire; hence, they must also be easier upon the believer than committing acts of unbelief.

Someone may oppose that view by quoting what Allah has said in the Quran, “Do not kill yourselves” (al-Nisaa 29). This verse would imply that one is not permitted to allow himself to be killed or to do the act that would lead to his own death. In Fath al-Baari, it is pointed out that these words are shortly followed with the words,

And whoever does that in aggression and injustice, then We will drive him into a Fire” (al-Nisaa 30). The one who has his soul killed for the sake of Allah is not one who has done such an act in aggression and injustice Therefore, this case is an example of a rukhsah or concession wherein one is allowed to opt for the concession but it is considered preferable not to do so. If he does not opt for the concession, he will receive a great reward from Allah. Al-Suyooti points out that the above ruling must be considered the general case. It is possible for there to be a situation in which it would be considered better for the person to opt for the concession instead of being killed. If the person being threatened is someone needed in the fight against the disbelievers or in establishing the shareeah, it would be best for him not to opt for death. This would be the case if he were, for example, the only scholar and only one able to lead the Muslims. In that case, the interest of the general public takes precedence over his personal interest of attaining martyrdom. Allah knows best.

Al-Jaboori, on the other hand, points out the opposite exception to the general ruling. He cites the case of a person who is followed by the masses and they look to him as their leader. If that person were to opt for the concession of stating words of unbelief, it may be confusing to the people and they may not understand what is going on. They may think their religious leader weak or hypocritical for rejecting faith under pressure. Therefore, due to the harm and confusion that would result in this case, that person would not be allowed to take the concession. Instead, he must remain firm, both outwardly and inwardly, even if he were killed. It should also be noted that there is a hadith which states, “Do not associate partners with Allah even if you are torn to pieces or set on fire.”

Ibn Rajab explains this hadith by stating that it is in reference to the true associating of partners with one’s heart. In other words, it is not in reference to outwardly showing an act or statement of unbelief while one’s heart is firm in belief.

6.7 Being Coerced to Kill Another Muslim

It is absolutely forbidden to intentionally kill another Muslim except as the result of due process of Islamic law. This is agreed upon, and may be established through a number of evidences from the Quran and sunnah, including Hadith #14 of this present collection. The following question now must be posed: Is one allowed to kill another Muslim when his own life is threatened or when the life of his family is threatened with death or imprisonment? It seems that there is a virtual consensus on the answer to this question: It is not allowed for one Muslim to save his life or the life of his family members by intentionally killing another Muslim.

This is because a Muslim has no more right to live than the Muslim he is going to kill. Hence, even though there is a case of coercion, he must accept his own fate from the one doing the coercing. It is forbidden for him to kill another Muslim. If he does so, he will definitely be considered a sinner. Even being threatened with the death of many members of one’s own family is not a valid excuse to intentionally kill another Muslim.

The killing of another Muslim is an example of an act that is still forbidden for a Muslim even under coercion. He is not excused due to the presence of the coercion. Al-Qurtubi wrote in his commentary of the Quran, The people of knowledge agree that if one is being coerced to kill another person, it is not allowed for him to go forward and kill him or to violate his rights by flogging him or otherwise. He must be patient and bear what is going to come to him. It is not allowed for him to save his own soul by somebody else’s. He should ask Allah for safety in both this life and the Hereafter.

The only difference of opinion among the scholars surrounding this issue is concerning to whom the law of retribution (“a life for a life”) will be applied. According to Malik, Ahmad and the clearest of the two narrations from al-Shafi’ee, the law of retribution is to be applied to both the one doing the coercing and the coerced. This is because they jointly share the responsibility for the killing: one as the cause and the other as the direct doer. The one doing the coercing is like a person who pushes another person into a pit of lions, being certain that the lions would eat him alive. Obviously, although he did not actually do the killing, he was the cause of the killing and must be punished. As for the coerced, he is wrongfully giving himself preference over another person and willfully taking the life of the other person and, hence, he also must be punished.

For Abu Hanifah, his student Muhammad and a second opinion attributed to al-Shafi’ee, the law of retribution is applied only to the one doing the coercing. This is because the coerced is simply like an instrument and cannot be held completely responsible for his act. Furthermore, they argue that a person is naturally inclined to want to preserve his life. Under such pressure, it is understandable that he may resort to such an objectionable act.

Yet a third opinion is that the retribution is to be imposed on the one doing the act of killing only. This is because he was the one directly responsible for the death and could not be considered simply an instrument. He has on his own willfully committed the act in order to save his own life. Furthermore, all the scholars agree that he has committed a sin and, therefore, the penalty should be on him for the sinful act he committed. This is the opinion of Zufar (the student of Abu Hanifah) and another opinion attributed to al-Shafi’ee.

Abu Yusuf was of the opinion that there is no retribution to be meted out in this case. This is because the “cause” of the act (the one doing the coercing) did not perform actually the act, and the doer was under coercion, which is enough of a complicating matter as to remove the prescribed punishment from him. Hence, according to Abu Yusuf, there is only blood money to be paid. It seems that the strongest opinion is the first one stated above, from
Ahmad and Malik. The evidence for it seems to be the strongest. The end result of that opinion should be the most positive.

6.8 Being Coerced to Break One’s Fast While Traveling

If a person is traveling during Ramadhaan, it is permissible for him to break his fast. Therefore, if he is fasting while traveling and his life is threatened with such words as, “We will kill you unless you break your fast,” it then becomes obligatory upon him to break his fast in order to save his life. If he does not break his fast in this case, he will be considered a sinner, because saving his life takes precedence over his permissible, non-obligatory act of continuing his fasting. However, this has more to do with principles relating to the law of necessity than with this particular hadith, “Allah has pardoned … ” In any case, this is an example of an act that becomes obligatory due to coercion.

6.9 Some Conclusions

Before ending the discussion of this hadith, a number of important conclusions should be highlighted:
(a) The correct wording of this hadith is, and Allah knows best, “Allah has pardoned for my Nation [what is done] mistakenly, out of forgetfulness or under duress.”
(b) The concept of umoom al-muqtadhaa in itself is a controversial topic. The Hanafis uniformly reject the concept. It is a concept that is often times attributed to al-Shafi’ee. However, he himself never seemed to have referred to such a concept. Among the followers of the Shafi’ee school, many of the leading legal theorists also reject the application of such a concept. If the concept of umoom al-muqtadhaa is rejected, it means that this hadith, “Allah has pardoned … ” is only in reference to the sinfulness of the act and recompense in the Hereafter. This hadith cannot be invoked, then, concerning any worldly ruling, such as a mistake made in the prayer, a transaction done under coercion and so forth. All of those worldly rulings must be governed by some texts or principles other than the hadith under discussion here.

(c) For those who do accept umoom al-muqtadhaa and apply it to this hadith, they must realize the implications of such an understanding of this hadith. The fact that what is done by mistake, out of forgetfulness or under coercion is overlooked now becomes something directly concluded from this text (hadith). It cannot be overruled by analogy on the basis of any other text. It cannot only be overruled for specific issues by specific texts concerning those specific issues. In other words, those scholars cannot have it both ways. They cannot say that this hadith applies to both sin and worldly ruling and then overrule its worldly ruling on the basis of weaker evidences.

(d) After a detailed review of the scholarly commentaries on this hadith, this author is of the definite conclusion that this hadith, “Allah has pardoned … ” is in reference to the sin of the act only- the fact that Allah will not punish a person for a wrong act done due to forgetfulness, by mistake or under coercion. As for the worldly rulings concerning acts done by mistake, out of forgetfulness or coercion, the conclusions concerning them must be sought from other sources as this particular hadith is completely irrelevant to such questions.
( e) It is extremely important that the scholar be absolutely certain as to whether he accepts the idea that this hadith refers to the sin only or both the sin and the worldly ruling. Then he must be consistent in his application of this hadith. It seems that many jurists of the past were not consistent in their application of their understanding of this hadith.
(f) If a person does something by mistake, he is not sinful. Furthermore, if that mistake were related to an act of worship and the result of ijtihaad and striving to find what is correct, the person need not repeat that act of worship if he determines later that he was incorrect in his ijtihaad. If a judge or mufti makes such ijtihaad and is mistaken, no sin is to be implied to him nor is he to be held responsible for the ramifications of his sincere ijtihaad (unless he was not qualified to make ijtihaad in the first place).

(g) If a person completely fails to perform an act of worship due to forgetfulness, he performs the act when he recalls it. This is based on an analogy with the one who has forgotten a prayer, that is explicitly discussed in a hadith.
(h) If a person forgets one aspect of an act or violates an act that he is performing out of forgetfulness, the question becomes more difficult. There is some evidence to show that this is overlooked and has no effect, such as in the case of the one who spoke in the prayer or the one who ate during his fast. Allah knows best. (Another approach is to discover whether or not there were factors that should have prevented him from forgetting something. If such factors were present, the act done due to forgetfulness is not overlooked. If such factors were not present, then the act done due to forgetfulness is overlooked.)

(i) Under coercion, if a person performs an act that has become a concession for him while under coercion, he may perform that act and it (and its implications) will not be ascribed to him. (The view of the Hanafis, which is more complex than this, was also presented earlier.)
(j) Under coercion, if a person performs an act that is still forbidden for him to perform even while under coercion, he will be a sinner and the act will be ascribed to him. He will share in the responsibility for the act he has committed.

Summary of the Hadith:
• By Allah’s mercy, He has decreed that He will overlook for the Prophet Muhammad’s (peace be upon him) followers what they do by mistake, out of forgetfulness or due to coercion.
• This means that Allah forgives any sinful aspect of those deeds but it does not mean that the worldly rulings concerning those deeds are to be overlooked.